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A Practitioner's Guide to the Tokyo Round Trade
Negotiations
by Thomas R. Graham*
Few, if any, communities in America are untouched by international trade. Small and large manufacturers across the country import
parts, export, or struggle with import competition. Workers who have
read of massive layoffs in Youngstown, Johnstown, or other steel-making
communities, or who have watched the U.S. color television industry
move its plants abroad, are understandably concerned with the effects
that imports may have on their jobs. Consumers are exhorted (on televisions made in Taiwan) to "look for the union label" in resisting the onslaught of imported clothing offered by local retailers, along with
imported shoes, watches, automobiles and cameras. Farmers' crops may
feed the hungry in Bangladesh under U.S. food-aid programs or be
purchased by the middle class in Japan provided our farm imports have
not met insurmountable foreign import barriers or been undersold by
producers from other nations who are benefiting from government subsidies.
There are numerous such examples of the interaction between international trade and ordinary economic life. Not surprisingly, this interaction raises many legal issues: what recourse has a small manufacturer
who is threatened with ruin by import competition? Does it make any
difference whether the competition is "fair" or "unfair," and what do
these terms mean? What rights have workers before or after their employer's business fails as a result of import competition? To whom can a
producer turn if he is shut out of a foreign market, either directly by high
tariffs or quota limits, or more subtly by customs red tape or the inability
to meet foreign product standards? What can be done for an exporter
who loses his foreign markets due to unfair competition by a third country's exporters? What can the United States government do about such
matters, and what can private persons or their attorneys do to make the
government act?
* Deputy General Counsel, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations,
Executive Office of the President. Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center. B.A.
1965, Indiana University; J.D. 1968, Harvard Law School. The views expressed herein are
solely those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Office of the Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations.

226

N.C.J.

INT'L

L. & COM. REG.

Despite the fact that these issues directly affect lives from Spokane
to Spartanburg, international trade law must seem a rarified specialty to
the general practitioner. There are good reasons for this. As in other
legal fields, one must stay abreast of the latest interpretations, congressional developments, and uses of executive discretion. International
trade actions and interpretations are also overlaid with complex issues of
foreign relations and delicate questions of executive versus congressional
prerogatives. Actions frequently are requested, resisted, and taken,
moreover, on behalf of whole industries or other aggregations such as the
American Footwear Industries Association, the American Textile Manufacturer's Association, the American Retail Federation, or the American
Importers Association. Most of these organizations, as well as the agencies that review their petitions, are located in Washington, D.C. It
should come as no surprise, then, that most international trade practice is
handled by a small group of Washington-based specialists.
The general practitioner, nevertheless, needs to be prepared to answer his clients' questions on international trade matters, to know where
he can find further information on particular issues, and to appreciate
when to seek help from the specialist. This article attempts to serve these
needs by bringing generalists up to date on major revisions of the international trading system which will shortly be agreed to by the United
States and other nations as a result of the "Tokyo Round" of multilateral
trade negotiations. It also attempts to indicate the types of extensive
changes in U.S. legislation that are likely to be effected as the Tokyo
Round agreements are approved and implemented.
I. BACKGROUND I
A.

What is the Tokyo Round?
1.

In a nutshell

The Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations-known generally either as the "Tokyo Round" or as the "MTN" 2-constitutes the
most ambitious effort in the past thirty years to reduce barriers to international trade and to redefine which practices are to be considered fair
or unfair among trading nations. For more than five years, representatives of ninety-eight nations have been meeting in Geneva 3 to bargain
I Portions of parts I and II of this article are based upon a manuscript that was prepared
by the author for submission to the CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL. That
manuscript, in an edited and expanded form, was published as Graham, Retormig the
Intemational Trading System. The Tokyo Round Trade Negotiations in the FinalStage, 12 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 1 (1979).
Permission
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL for
2 The terms "Tokyo Round"

has been granted by the editors of the

CORNELL

the reprinting of material used in the article cited above.
and "MTN" are used interchangeably in this article.
3 The name of the Tokyo Round is derived from the fact that the declaration of foreign
ministers that inaugurated the negotiations was made in Tokyo in September 1973. See note 10,
infa. Virtually all of the negotiations have in fact been held at the offices of the GATT secretariat in Geneva.
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down each other's tariff rates and to draft new international rules governing government subsidies that aid exports, product standards that discriminate against foreign goods, government purchasing practices that
exclude bids by foreign suppliers, and several other "non-tariff" matters.
The results of these negotiations are expected to be translated into law in
the United States and other nations, where they will influence, perhaps
for a generation, concepts of fair and unfair international trading practices and the actions that nations might choose to take to offset the effects
of those practices.
The Tokyo Round's international agreements are expected to be
concluded in April and to be approved and implemented by the U.S.
Congress during the summer and early fall. Before dealing in detail with
the emerging MTN agreements and the prospects for implementing legislation, however, it would be useful to briefly describe how the negotiations came about in the first place.
2.

Historical Context

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was formulated in 1947 as a body of rules accepted by trading nations for the promotion and maintenance of an open post-war international trading
system. 4 In a sense the GATT rules represent an international effort to
unify national laws and practices with respect to the treatment of exports
and imports. The GATT, however, goes beyond unification and also
provides methods for dispute settlement and enforcement of its rules.
Moreover, the GATT maintains a relatively small international secretariat to facilitate meetings of the "Contracting Parties" and to oversee the
operation of the GATT rules.
Since the creation of the GATT, the secretariat and Contracting
Parties have sponsored periodic "rounds" of negotiations aimed at reducing barriers to the international movement of goods. 5 Until recently,
these "multilateral" or multi-nation negotiations have concentrated al4 GATT, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-I1, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. The Agreement has been modified in several respects since 1947. The current version is contained in 4
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCuMENTS (1969) [hereinafter cited as GATT, BISD]. The GATT was formulated in 1947 as a

framework of rules designed to promote an open and fair post-war international trading system.
The GATT rules were to be one component of a more comprehensive International Trade

Organization, which in turn was to have joined with the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund to form the pillars of the post-war international economic system. When the
ITO collapsed in 1949, principally as a result of the failure of the U.S. Congress to ratify the
treaty establishing it, the GATT rules became the nucleus of a small international organization.
For more information about the background of the GATT, see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE
AND THE LAW OF GATT 35-57 (1969).
5 The first round after the formation of the GATT took place in 1949 at Annecy, France.
The second round was held in 1951 at Torquay, England. The third, fourth, and fifth rounds
took place in 1955, 1960-61, and 1962-67 at Geneva, Switzerland. &e J. JACKSON, supra note 4,
at 217-19. See also J. EVANS, THE KENNEDY ROUND IN AMERICAN TRADE POLICY: TWILIGHT

OF THE GATT? (1971).
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most exclusively upon the reciprocal lowering of tariff barriers. Beginning with the "Kennedy Round" in the mid-1960s, however, there was
general recognition that tariffs had become less of an obstacle to international trade than more subtle "non-tariff barriers" used by many countries. Examples of non-tariff barriers include the exclusion of foreign
suppliers from bidding for government contracts and the failure to certify foreign products as meeting domestic health or safety standards.
Such practices are inadequately covered by the current GATT rules.
Clarification of the international rules pertaining to these practices has
seemed to be in the best interest of all trading nations.
Beginning in the late 1960s there was also growing recognition that
the GATT rules were outmoded, ignored, or in need of strengthening in
several key areas. The most important of these areas are: government
subsidies that may confer unfair competitive advantages upon exported
'6
goods; temporary restrictions on imports under the "escape clause,"
which is designed to give domestic industries harmed by import competition a breathing space in which to adjust; government restrictions on
exporting; and the settlement of disputes among nations over international trade questions.
Other events also indicated that fundamental adjustments to the international trading system were needed. First, the European Economic
Community (E.E.C.) emerged as a trading entity with bargaining
strength approximately equal to that of the United States, and thus challenged the virtual hegemony of the United States in postwar trading relationships. Second, developing countries gained a unified international
voice with the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. 7 The LDCs 8 have used this forum to vigorously promote their trading interests, some of which conflict
with basic tenets of the GATT system such as the "most-favored nation"
(MFN) principle of equal treatment among all trading nations regardless
of their relative economic strengths.
These factors, combined with fear that the GATT might go the way
of fixed exchange rates after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, 9
led nearly one hundred foreign ministers, meeting in Tokyo in September of 1973, to initiate negotiations to " . . . cover tariffs, non-tariff barriers and other measures which impede or distort international trade in
both industrial and agricultural products. . . ."0 This "Tokyo Declara6 Trade Act of 1974, §§ 201-203, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1976).
7 For a full report on the 1964 UNCTAD Conference, see UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, Proc., 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 46/141, Vol. I

(E/CONF. 46/139).
8 The term "LDCs" refers to the less developed countries.
9 For a concise history of the Bretton Woods System, see B.J.

COHEN, ORGANIZING THE
WORLD'S MONEY 89 (1977).
10 Declaration of Ministers Approved at Tokyo on 14 September, 1973, para. 4, reprintedin

GATT, BISD (20th Supp.) 19, 21 (1974). For the text of the Tokyo Declaration, see also J.
JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 489-91 (1977).
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tion" gave the name to the Tokyo Round and also established its terms
of reference.
Although the Tokyo Declaration formally inaugurated the negotiations, several years passed before serious bargaining began. The first reason for delay was the U.S. Administration's lack of legal authority, at the
time of the Tokyo Declaration, to implement within the United States
the obligations that it was expected to undertake in trade agreements. A
few words about the special implementation problems of the United
States are in order.
B. How Wil the Tokyo Round Affect US.Trade Laws?
The President and members of the Executive branch obviously need
no authorization from the Congress to confer with representatives of foreign governments or to reach formal agreements with them. These activities clearly fall within the foreign affairs power of the President.II
The Executive cannot, however, carry out international agreements
calling for changes in U.S. domestic laws that regulate foreign commerce, and thus fall within the Constitutional authority of the Congress,' 2 without some type of congressional participation. That
participation may take several forms. First, a two-thirds majority of the
Senate could ratify the agreement as a treaty; second, the Congress could
delegate to the President (under sufficiently precise terms) advance authority to agree upon and proclaim certain changes in U.S. law; or, third,
the Congress could stand aside while the President negotiated, and, after
an agreement was concluded, decide whether to enact legislation altering
U.S. law in ways necessary to implement the President's agreements.
All three of these approaches, in their pure forms, were unacceptable for congressional implementation of Tokyo Round trade agreements. If the agreements were implemented as treaties the House of
Representatives would have no opportunity to consider possible alterations in the conditions under which the United States assesses penalty
duties against various types of "unfair" foreign trade practices. Such a
result would be not only politically unacceptable but might also create
an unconstitutional exclusion of the House from consideration of "revenue" matters. 13 Delegation to the Executive of a "blank check" in the
form of unrestricted advance discretion to negotiate and implement very
controversial changes in U.S. trade legislation simply was not politically
acceptable to the Congress, and delegation by the Congress of authority
to reach trade agreements with precisely-specified terms probably would
have made the negotiation of such agreements impossible because other
II L.

HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 37 (1972).

12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3, grants to the Congress the power to "regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . ."
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, ci. 1, provides that "[all bills for raising revenue shall originate
in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with the amendments as
on other bills .... "

N.CJ.
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countries would view such a delegation as an ultimatum. Finally, a
"wait and see" approach by the Congress with possible enactment as ordinary legislative amendments of any changes in U.S. law that might be
mandated by agreements would have been a stance acceptable to the
Congress but not to other countries with whom the United States might
negotiate. Understandably, they remember the League of Nations, the
Havana Charter,' 4 and other agreements that were negotiated but not
accepted and implemented by the U.S. Congress. They are for the most
part unwilling to make the painful and politically risky internal compromises necessary to reach trade agreements with the United States unless there is a strong likelihood that the agreements will be accepted and
implemented by the Congress.
These factors created a clear-cut dilemma: the Congress must maintain its ultimate right to accept or reject legislative changes needed to
carry out obligations undertaken in trade agreements, yet other countries
will not negotiate seriously unless they have reasonable advance assurance that the United States will in fact carry out its obligations.
in the Trade Act of 1974,15 which provides the legislative framework for U.S. participation in the Tokyo Round, the Congress attempted
to get U.S. negotiators off the horns of this dilemma by enacting a
unique set of expedited ("fast-track") procedures for considering and implementing non-tariff agreements.1 6 In these provisions, the Congress
urges the President to negotiate agreements " . . . reducing, harmonizing, or eliminating non-tariff barriers to and other distortions of international trade ... ,,17 and calls for close consultations between the
Executive and interested Congressional Committees as the negotiations
proceed.18 At least ninety days before signing any non-tariff agreement
to be implemented under these expedited procedures, the President is
required to formally notify the Congress and the public of his intention
to do so. After any such agreement has been signed, the President is to
submit to the Congress the following information:
a. a copy of the agreement;
b. a description of administrative action ('.e., Executive orders or
regulations) anticipated in implementing the agreement; and
a proposed implementing bill, containing(i) express congressional approval of the agreement and the
description of administrative action; and
(ii) changes in existing law, or new statutory authority needed
c.

14 The Havana Charter embodied the treaty that would have founded the International
Trade Organization, had that treaty been ratified by the U.S. Senate.
15 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified in scattered sections of 5,
19, 26 and 31 U.S.C.).
16 Trade Act of 1974, §§ 102, 151,. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2112, 2191 (1976).
17 Trade Act of 1974, § 102(a), 19 U.S.C. § 2112(a).
18 Trade Act of 1974, § 102(c), 19 U.S.C. § 2112(c).
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to implement the agreement. 19
The most significant features of legislation proposed under these
procedures are that such legislation cannot be amended and must be
20
voted upon by each house of the Congress within a specified period.
These procedures are intended to assure insofar as possible that non-tariff
trade agreements are formulated by U.S. negotiators in such a way as to
be acceptable to the Congress, and that the agreements and their implementing legislation will receive prompt attention in the form in which
they were submitted. This assurance has been sufficient to induce other
nations to work seriously toward a conclusion of Tokyo Round agreements.
On January 4, 1979, President Carter notified the Congress of his
intention to sign Tokyo Round agreements covering a wide variety of
subjects. 2 1 Accordingly, the first step for setting in motion the Trade
Act's special implementing procedures has been taken. It is now anticipated that the signed agreements2 2 together with legislation necessary to
approve and implement them will-be submitted to the Congress in April
or early May.
C

Does the Private Sector Influence the Results?

Throughout the negotiations the Administration has maintained a
wide network of advisory committees representing different segments of
the private sector. These committees, which were mandated by the
Trade Act of 1974,23 are run by the Special Trade Representative's Office 24 in conjunction with the Departments of Agriculture, Labor and
Commerce. At the top of the pyramid-like structure of committees is a
single "Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations," composed of fortyfive prominent persons representing government, labor, industry, agriculture, small business, service industries, retailors, consumer interests, and
the general public. 25 Next in the hierarchy are committees representing
19 Trade Act of 1974, § 102(e), 19 U.S.C. § 2112(e).
20 The period for a vote in the Congress is sixty Congressional working days unless legisla-

tion submitted under these procedures is considered to be a "revenue bill," in which case the

period for voting is ninety Congressional working days. These periods are divided as follows:
committees in the Senate and the House are to have forty-five working days in which to consider the bill, after which it is discharged automatically from committee unless it has been
reported earlier; each house of the Congress is then to have fifteen working days to vote on the
bill, except that if the bill is a revenue measure then only the House is to vote within that fifteen

day period-and the Senate is to vote on the bill within thirty additional working days after the
House has voted on it.

21 This notice was published in 44 Fed. Reg. 1933 (1979) (to be codified at - C.F.R. __).
22 The content of the agreement is discussed in part II, refta, and some indications of how
the implementing legislation may change existing law are given in part III.
23 Trade Act of 1974, § 135, 19 U.S.C. § 2155 (1976).

24 Inquiries with respect to the structure or operation of these committees should be addressed to the industry liaison officer, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, 1800 G Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506.
25 The act specifically provides, "The President shall establish an Advisory Committee for
Trade Negotiations to provide overall policy advice. . . .The Committee shall be composed of

232

N.C.J.

INT'L

L. & COM. REG.

agriculture, industry, and labor policy respectively. Finally, within each
of these three sectors a large number of technical committees represent
the interests of particular industries or unions-such as the committees
representing the textile, tobacco, steel, and chemical industries; the
grains, meat and dairy agricultural sectors; and the clothing and auto
workers unions. The members of these committees, who are spread
throughout the country, receive the latest confidential information concerning the state of negotiations, and provide government negotiators
with advice as to U.S. bargaining positions.
Through these advisory committees, the private sector undoubtedly
has influenced the Tokyo Round negotiations by sharpening U.S. negotiating goals and by providing virtually immediate feedback as to the acceptability of various possible agreements. These committees will shortly
draft reports for the Congress on each of the Tokyo Round agreements.
No doubt these reports will significantly influence the congressional view
of the agreements' acceptability. In addition, the advisory committees
currently are being consulted intensively with respect to initial Administration drafts of proposals to implement the results of the Tokyo Round.
II.

THE TOKYO ROUND AGREEMENTS

By February 1979, negotiators had reached agreement on all but a
few of the most difficult points, 26 and the Administration was actively
preparing to implement U.S. commitments. This section briefly discusses the status of negotiations at that time with respect to the principal
subjects.
A.

Industrzal Tar//i

Periodic reduction of tariff rates does not have the real effect upon
trade flows that it once did, largely because the six multilateral negotiating rounds prior to the Tokyo Round did their work so well. Not only is
the average incidence of industrial tariffs already relatively low in most
industrial countries, but negotiated tariff reductions are also phased in,
or "staged," over a period of years in order to reduce their impact upon
domestic industries. 2 7 Because tariff reductions traditionally have been
the subject of trade negotiations, however, and because the results of
tariff negotiations are readily identifiable and quantifiable, the average
not more than forty-five individuals, and shall include representatives of

. .

. (those listed in

text)." See Trade Act of 1974, § 135(b)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 2155(b)(1) (1976).
26 It was agreed during the summer of 1977 that agricultural products would not be included among those subject to the general tariff formula, but rather would be negotiated on the

basis of specific requests for tariff reductions extended from some governments to others, which
then would respond with offers.
27 The Trade Act's "staging" requirements specify that duty-rate reductions, pursuant to
trade agreements, must be phased in at not more than three percentage points per year, or onetenth of the total reduction called for by the agreement, whichever is larger. All such staging
must be completed within ten years following the initial reduction. Trade Act of 1974, § 109,
19 U.S.C. § 2119 (1976).
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reduction of industrial tariffs that emerges from the MTN will be cited
by many as a yardstick of the negotiations' success.
The most convenient way yet found to negotiate tariff rates on
thousands of individual products from scores of countries is for the participants to first adopt a general mathematical formula, or hypothesis,
specifying the percentage by which all tariffs are to be reduced, and then
to bargain hard about which products are to be exempt from tariff reductions or subjected to higher or lower reductions than those called for
by the formula. The formula that was adopted by MTN participants
after years of haggling would, if applied to all products, result in an average worldwide tariff reduction of about forty percent. This formula also
was designed to reduce higher tariffs by a greater amount than lower
ones, and thus contained a significant element of tariff "harmoniza28
tion."
The negotiating parties have also agreed that tariff reductions, once
settled, would be phased in over a period of eight years with a review to
take place after the first five years to determine whether external economic conditions warrant a continuation of the reductions. This "conditionality" factor was politically important for acceptance of the formula
within the E.E.C. Its real importance may be questioned, however, in
view of the relatively minor tariff reductions involved.
The tariff negotiations have been virtually completed. Although
their precise results remain confidential, the Administration has made it
known that (taking into account exceptions to the general formula) these
negotiations are expected to result in an average worldwide reduction of
tariff rates on industrial products of about thirty percent.2 9 Several industries in which the United States has strong export interests, such as
paper, computers, office machines, scientific instruments, and chemicals,
are expected to benefit from these reductions.
B.

Non-TariffMatters
1.

Subsidies and CountervailingDuties

As a system designed primarily to promote open and fair competition among private industries, the GATT has always had difficulty coping
with government aids to industry. Those relatively few subsidies that are
imposed directly for the purpose of promoting exports do not create the
difficulty because the GATT rules and settled practice generally regard
such practices as unfair methods of competition. Problems arise, instead,
with respect to the myriad forms of subsidies that are viewed by the governments granting them as legitimate instruments of domestic socio-economic policy, but that may almost incidentally confer advantages upon
28 See Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, "Briefing Paper," Feb.
9, 1979, on file with the NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL REGULATION.

29 Se "Briefing Paper," id.
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the recipient industries in the international marketplace: nationalizations; tax holidays to invest in economically-depressed regions; concessionary loans or direct grants to maintain full employment during
recessions; and grants for research and development of new technology.
Such practices raise a central dilemma for the international trading system: how to balance the freedom to make these sovereign national policy
choices against the collective rights of the international trading system.
The present GATT rules on subsidies and countervailing duties
seem reasonably straightforward. "Export subsidies" for industrial products are prohibited if they result in a lower price for the export than is
charged for the same product domestically. 30 Any "bounty or subsidy"
that causes or threatens material injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to retard materially the establishment of a domestic
industry may be subject to a countervailing duty by the importing na3
tion sufficient to offset the effect of the subsidy. '
These deceptively simple rules create a number of legal and political
problems. Legal problems arise from the lack of definition of "export
subsidies." The difference between "export subsidies" and other "domestic subsidies" is in many cases wholly unclear. An overriding source of
international political friction has been the fact that the U.S. countervailing duty law does not require a showing of "material injury" to a
domestic industry, as is required by the GATT rules. 32 U.S. law requires
the Secretary of the Treasury to impose countervailing duties upon any
dutiable imports 33 that he finds to be benefiting from a "bounty or
grant." Understandably, other nations have sought in the MTN to secure adoption by the United States of an injury, standard. Equally understandably, the United States has sought to ensure that the GATT
rules impose greater discipline over the increasing tendency of foreign
30 GATT art. XVI(4), 4 BISD at 27, provides:
Further, as from 1January 1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter, contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any form of subsidy on the export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy
results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower than the comparable
ce charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market. Until 31
cember 1957 no contracting party shall extend the scope of any such subsidization beyond that existing on I January 1955 by the introduction of new, or the
extension of existing, subsidies.
31 GATT art. VI(6)(a), 4 BISD at 11. See text accompanying note 32 infra.
32 Id. This article provides that,
No contracting party shall levy any. . . countervailing duty on the importation
of any product of the territory of another contracting party unless it determines
that the effect of the . . . subsidization,..., is such as to cause or threaten material injury to an established domestic industry, or is such as to retard materially
the establishment of a domestic industry.
33 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b) (1976). This section provides that when the Secretary determines
the bounty to be paid with respect to any article that is free of duty, he shall advise the Commission, and after investigation the Commission shall determine whether the industry, "is being or
is likely to be injured or is prevented from being established." If the determination of the Commission is affirmative, the Secretary shall make an order directing assessment and collection of
duties.
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governments to aid their industries in ways that, indirectly at least, confer internationally competitive advantages.
The draft agreement on subsidie's and countervailing duties that has
emerged from the Tokyo Round seeks to reconcile these positions by providing greater discipline over the use of subsidies and by ensuring that all
nations subscribing to the agreement require a showing of "material injury" before applying countervailing duties to subsidized imports.
Greater discipline over subsidies is to be provided in a number of ways.
Non-agricultural primary products (such as minerals) as well as industrial products are to be included within the flat prohibition on export
subsidies. An "illustrative list" of prohibited export subsidies that the
GATT has maintained for some years will be updated. Also, recognizing
that politically sensitive domestic subsidies " . . . are intended to promote important objectives of national policy but may have adverse effects, which signatories should seek to avoid, on the trade and production
interests of other signatories, ' 34 the agreement provides that types of domestic subsidies that may have adverse effects on international competition are to be listed as "indicative guidelines."
The agreement stipulates two methods by which importing countries may offset the effects of subsidized imports. The first method is the
traditional one of applying countervailing duties to subsidized imports
35
that are causing or threatening material injury to a domestic industry.
The second authorized "track" for offsetting the effects of subsidized import competition is the imposition of "countermeasures" against any subsidy practices that result in "serious prejudice" to an industry in another
signatory country. These countermeasures may take the form of trade
retaliation based on an international complaint to the GATT that a subsidy rule has been violated and a review and authorization of such trade
retaliation by a GATT dispute settlement panel convened under the
GATT procedures for complaint resolution. 36 Serious prejudice, moreover, might be presumed in cases where the exporting country violated
the express prohibition on export subsidies. The concept of serious
prejudice includes not only adverse effects upon domestic industries
through the increase of subsidized imports, but also covers the loss of export markets if the subsidized products of one country displace non-subsidized goods of another either within the subsidizing country ("importsubstitution subsidies") or in third countries where the subsidized and
non-subsidized exports compete ("third-country market displacement").
In addition, the new agreement on subsidies and countervailing du(on

34 MTN Outline of An Arrangement with respect to Subsidies and Countervailing Duties
file with the NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL

REGULATION).
35 Thus the

United States would accept a "material injury" standard for dutiable goods in
its countervailing duty law. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
36 The procedures for complaint resolution are found in GATT arts. XXII-XXIII, 4 BISD
at 39-40.
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ties would permit "provisional measures," consisting of temporary penalty duties or other import restrictions. Such measures are to be taken
almost immediately in cases where there is a preliminary finding of injury caused by subsidized imports, and where serious harm is threatened
unless rapid action is taken.
Considered together, these increased disciplines over subsidy practices appear to represent a significant victory for U.S. negotiators, and a
reasonable price to pay for a limited injury standard in the U.S. countervailing duty law.
2.

Safeguards

Every country needs a socio-political safety valve when import competition seriously injures a domestic industry and idles its workers. Article XIX of the GATT and corresponding provisions in U.S. legislation
contain such an "escape-clause," permitting import barriers to be raised
temporarily in such cases, ostensibly to allow the domestic industry
37
breathing space to adjust, provided that certain conditions are met.
The most important issue in the safeguards negotiations-and the
most significant issue that is still unsettled in the MTN-involves the
possible use of "escape-clause" safeguard actions on a "selective," or
country-specific, basis. The history of the GATT safeguards provision
clearly establishes that escape-clause actions are to be taken only on an
MFN basis; a country's temporary import restrictions on a particular
product are to be applied equally to the imports of the product from all
sources. U.S. legislation permits, but does not require, the President to
38
impose escape-clause import relief on a non-MFN basis.
The problem with the GATT's MFN requirement for escape-clause
actions lies in the fact that countries have in recent years found it politically imperative to restrict imports selectively-from one or two countries only--either because one or two countries had accounted for most of
an import surge (and the action thus could be billed as "minimally"
trade-restrictive), or because they feared the consequences of limiting imports from a major trading partner. In taking these selective actions,
countries either have circumvented GATT discipline by imposing (under
threat of more severe unilateral restrictions) "orderly marketing agreements"-or agreed quotas-upon one or two trading partners, or have
surreptitiously secured "voluntary" export restraint commitments by one
37 In the GATT, these conditions are that "as a result of unforeseen developments and of
the obligations incurred by a contracting party under [the GATT] . . .any product is being
imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased quantities and under
such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury. . . ." GATT art. XIX(l), 4 BISD at 36.
The U.S. "escape clause" law, which is set forth in the Trade Act of 1974, §§ 201-203, 19 U.S.C.
§§ 2251-2253 (1976) does not require the link between injury and a past trade concession, and
uses the standard of "substantial cause of serious injury."
38 Trade Act of 1974, § 203(k), 19 U.S.C. § 2253(k) (1976).
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or two exporting countries.3 9 These arrangements escape the normal
GATT discipline of reporting, consulting, and settling amicably or suffering retaliation because the Contracting Party against whom such
agreements are imposed usually "agrees" to waive these GATT rights,
which it is formally free to do even though the agreement is in fact a
"contract of adhesion."
After much preliminary sparring, it now has been agreed (at least
among developed countries) that some form of selectivity will be allowed.
The conditions for imposing such selective restrictions, however, have not
yet been settled. It is not yet clear whether import restraints against one
or two countries will be permitted only upon their agreement to such
restraints, only with the consent of the GATT safeguards review body if
agreement of the affected country or countries is not secured, or unilaterally if neither agreement nor international consent can be secured
promptly.
3.

Government Procurement

Government agencies buy for their own use everything from spacecraft to paper clips. Nations ensure that most of this multi-billion dollar
market is reserved for domestic producers. Techniques for accomplishing
this purpose range from formal "margins of preference" (requirements
that domestic bids be accepted unless they are a specified percentage
above foreign ones), such as the Buy America Act, 40 exclusions of foreign
bidders from eligibility lists, failure to advertise contracts or solicit bids,
and awarding of contracts without disclosure of the criteria on which the
award was based. By limiting market access of foreign manufacturers,
all these practices constitute significant non-tariff barriers to trade. The
GATT rules at present do not expressly deal with government procurement practices, except to exempt preferences for domestic manufacturers
from the "national treatment" principle, which calls for non-discrimina41
tion in the conditions of sale as between domestic and foreign products.
The MTN agreement on government procurement is intended to
eliminate "buy national" preferences and to require open procedures
with respect to bidding for a specified list of government entities in signatory countries. The exact entities to be covered by these requirements
are still a subject of negotiation at this writing. Government defense con39 In general trade usage, a "voluntary restraint agreement" or "voluntary export restraint" is an imposed agreement by the exporting country to restrain its exports of the product
in question to the country that is imposing the agreement. Such agreements may be publicly
announced, or may be confidential. For a discussion of their domestic legality (prior to enactment of the Trade Act), sea Consumers Union v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
"Orderly marketing agreements," by contrast, is a term of art in U.S. law, meaning a public
agreement pursuant to an escape-clause action under the Trade Act with restraint at both the
importing and the exporting ends.
40 41 U.S.C. §§ 1Oa-10c (1976).
41 Article III of the GATT embodies the national treatment principle and article III(8)(b)
exempts government purchasing. GATT art. III (8)(b), 4 BISD at 7.
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tracts involving national security clearly v'ill not be covered. Questions
remain, however, about such quasi-governmental bodies as publiclyowned utilities, transportation facilities, and post, telegraph, and telephone facilities. Not surprisingly, national viewpoints have tended to reflect the degree to which such entities are owned by governments within
the various MTN participant countries.
.

Technical Barriers to Trade (Standards)

A U.S. anti-pollution standard could be written in technical terms
that in fact excluded Toyotas from the U.S. market. The E.E.C. could
require that U.S.-made radios be certified by an E.E.C. authority as conforming to Community electrical safety standards-and then could decline to certify the U.S. products. Japan could refuse to accept foreign
test results on the safety of gas stoves, and then could subject U.S.-made
stoves to more stringent or expensive tests than those applicable to the
same products made in Japan.
These hypothetical examples illustrate in somewhat exaggerated
form the way in which product standards and related testing and certification practices can be used as non-tariff barriers to trade. In reality, the
line between legitimate regulation of health, safety, the environment, or
the consumer, on one hand, and the illegitimate exclusion of imports, on
the other, tends to be less clear. At present the GATT does not address
the effect of standards practices upon the movement of goods.
The standards negotiations have moved slowly, in part because of
the political sensitivity of any international agreement that even appears
to surrender some degree of national sovereignty over national rule-making in the areas of health, safety, environment, and consumerism. Negotiators have handled these politically-charged problems by developing an
agreement that is purely procedural. The agreement does not dictate to
any signatory the substantive standards that it must adopt. Instead, the
standards code would establish the principles that standards and related
testing and certification should not be used to create unnecessary obstacles to international trade, that open procedures including the publication and receipt of comments on drafts be used, that international
standardization be promoted to the extent possible, and that foreign testing and certification of conformity with product standards be permitted
where feasible.
A further difficulty with the standards code revolves around the fact
that the code calls for signatories to use "all reasonable means within
their power" to ensure compliance with its provisions by local governments and private-sector standardizing organizations. The Administration still is in the process of developing legislation that would carry out
this obligation.
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Customs Valuation

The main purpose of the MTN negotiations on customs valuation is
to develop a new set of international rules that will harmonize divergent
national valuation systems and reduce the possibility of artificially inflated customs appraisals. Another purpose of the negotiations is to introduce more objective valuation criteria which will thus allow traders to
predict with more accuracy and certainty the value of their products for
customs purposes.
The current U.S. system for customs valuation is an example of both
the unpredictability and the artificially "inflating" characteristics that
many systems contain. Under the American system, there are nine different methods for determining customs value, depending on the product
being valued and the circumstances under which the product is imported. One of these nine valuation methods is the controversial American Selling Price system, by which certain products are valued for tariff
purposes at the level of the domestically-produced articles with which
they compete. 42 This American Selling Price system was first enacted in
1922 and thus is protected by "grandfathering" against the GATT admonition that customs appraisals should not reflect "the value of merchandise of national origin . . .or fictitious values."'4 3 The valuation
systems of most other nations also have controversial protective features
that create problems for U.S. exporters.
The current draft customs code that is under consideration in the
Tokyo Round establishes the "transaction value"--defined as the price
actually paid or payable with additions for certain costs possibly not reflected in that price-as the most preferred valuation method. In many
cases, however, such as those involving non-arm's-length transactions between a subsidiary and a parent company, transaction value cannot be
used. Accordingly, the draft code establishes alternative bases of valuation, to be used in the following order of precedence when the transaction value is inappropriate: the transaction value for an "identical good"
preferably made by the same manufacturer but sold in a different transaction; the value of "similar goods" that are produced in the same country and that are commercially interchangeable; a "deductive value"
based on the price of the good on resale after importation minus expenses
involved in the resale; and a "computed value" based on the estimated
cost of production.
42 19 U.S.C. § 1401a(e) (1976). The products subject to the American Selling Price system
include benzenoid chemicals, rubber footwear, and certain types of shellfish. For a detailed
description of the system, see Tariffand Trade Proposals HearingsBefore the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970) (statement of Ambassador Carl J. Gilbert, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations).
43 GATT art. VII(2)(a), 4 BISD at 12.
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Import Licensing

This negotiation constitutes an effort to adopt international rules to
limit and regulate the instances in which countries may require import
licenses as a condition of importation by ensuring "that licensing systems
are employed by all countries only when necessary, are not designed to
distort trade, are transparent and are administered in a fair and equitable manner."' 4 4 Separate draft texts currently cover automatic licensing
(licensing used not to restrict imports but instead for such purposes as the
collection of statistics) and restrictive licensing (the use of import licenses
to administer import quotas). At present automatic licensing can cause
unnecessary burdens for importers, and restrictive licenses frequently are
administered arbitrarily and without disclosure of the permitted quota
amounts.
7

Commercial Counterfeiting

The sale of counterfeit goods, ranging from fake "Levis" to spurious
Swiss watches is a serious and growing problem. This practice costs genuine producers both money and good will, and defrauds consumers
through the use of bogus trademarks and other indicia of identification.
Most countries wish to end these deceptive practices by strengthening the
existing international rules set forth in Article IX of the GATT 45 and in
Article 9 of the Paris Convention on Industrial Property. 46 At present
the Paris Convention requires only seizure of offending goods. One
means of tightening these rules is to amend the Paris Convention to require forfeiture of these goods as well. This possibility, among others, is
currently under consideration in the Tokyo Round.
8. Sectoral Negotiatins." Steel and Aircrafl
The recent worldwide recession in the steel industry, and intense
competition between the E.E.C. and the United States in the aircraft
industry within the past eighteen months, have given considerable significance to negotiations concerning these two industries. With respect to
steel, widespread layoffs of workers and idle capacity during the past
three years generated such strong protectionist pressures in the E.E.C.
and the United States that a global understanding regarding trade in
steel appeared to be the only alternative to an international "steel war."
Such an understanding was developed in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD); 47 this development was closely
44 Statement by Several Delegations on Current Status of Tokyo Round Negotiations,
GATT Doc. MTN/INF/33 (July 13, 1978) (on file with the NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCIAL REGULATION).

45 GATT art. IX, 4 BISD at 15.
46 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, revisedat Stockholm, July 14,
1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923.
47 New York Times, Dec. 1, 1977, at D 12, col. 4.
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related to the Tokyo Round negotiations.
The OECD steel agreement establishes a Steel Committee under
OECD auspices. The objectives of that Committee are to encourage the
continuation and extension of free trade in steel, and to provide a means
of disseminating information and coordinating policies among governments with respect to trade in steel. In addition to the establishment of
this OECD Steel Committee, MTN tariff negotiators are exploring the
possibility of tariff equalization for steel on a product-by-product basis
among the major developed countries.
With respect to aircraft, delegations are studying the possibility of
eliminating import duties on aircraft and aircraft parts, as well as possibly eliminating the-U.S. duty on repairs performed abroad on U.S. aircraft. In addition, the United States would like to broaden the scope of
this agreement to include some limitation of "predatory" aircraft financing practices.
9.

Agriculture

Agricultural trade presents some of the most intractable but, for the
United States at least, most politically important issues of the Tokyo
Round. As the world's largest exporter of agricultural products, the
United States has several objectives: gaining greater access to foreign
markets now nearly closed to many important U.S. agricultural exports;
obtaining assurances that competition between the United States and
other exporting nations for the markets of third countries is reasonably
fair; and improving the overall application of the GATT rules to agricultural trade.
The United States is concerned in the MTN both about market access for our agricultural exports, and about subsidies that other trading
nations use to increase exports of their farm products. Such agricultural
subsidies, like their industrial counterparts, give the subsidized products
an unfair advantage in the competition for world markets. The GATT
exercises little discipline over agricultural subsidies, specifying only that
Contracting Parties should "seek to avoid the use of subsidies on the export of primary products."'48 In addition, subsidies that increase the subsidizing country's exports "shall not be applied in a manner which results
in that contracting party having more than an equitable share of world
export trade in that product. '49 Not only is the obligation not to subsidize agricultural exports precatory rather than mandatory, but "an equitable share of world export trade" is such an imprecise concept that the
provision is little more than an exhortation. In both the negotiations on
subsidies and those on agricultural trade, the United States is attempting
to strengthen this GATT provision.
48 GATT art. XVI 3, 4 BISD, at 26.
49 Id.
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The MTN negotiators are also discussing the possibility of a commodity agreement establishing minimum world prices for certain dairy
products. The dairy agreement would create a consultative body under
the auspices of the GATT for considering problems in world dairy trade.
The moving forces behind the dairy negotiations have been the E.E.C.
and New Zealand. The United States, however, has not placed a high
priority on these negotiations, because the minimum prices would probably be well below current U.S. domestic support prices for dairy products50 and thus would have no direct effect on the U.S. dairy industry.
An international meat arrangement, which would cover trade in live
cattle and most types of beef and edible cattle products, is also being
considered by negotiators. It would create another advisory council to
facilitate consultations and the flow of information about international
trade in meat. In its present form, the arrangement would not contain
economic provisions.
Finally, the negotiators have reached a "general understanding on
agriculture" that "could provide a framework for avoiding continuing
political and commercial confrontations in this highly sensitive sector
....
"51 This understanding would probably begin with the establishment of a GATT consultation committee, which may ultimately produce
greater international supervision of agricultural trade.
10.

Other Measuresfor Reformtng the GA TT rules

a. An "Enabling Clause"for Developtng Countires-Oneof
the pillars of the post-war trading system has been the most-favorednation principle embodied in GATT article I, which stipulates that
C9
**any
advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to
the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all
other contracting parties." For years developing countries have
sought some modification of this principle that would permit some
forms of special treatment for LDC exports. One milestone in this
effort was international acceptance of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), by which selected exports from developing countries
are allowed to enter the markets of developed countries at lower duty
rates than those applicable to the same products from developed
52
countries.
The GSP, however, is but one small facet of North-South trading
relations. Moreover, it was given international legitimacy only by a
50 7 U.S.C. § 1446 (1976).

51 Statement by Several Delegations, supra note 35, at 6.
52 See GATT art. XXXVI, 4 BISD, at 53.

PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE

243

temporary waiver provided by the GATT Contracting Parties. 5 3 The
developing countries have sought in the MTN to provide a permanent basis for the GSP, and to broaden the possibilities for special
treatment in other areas. They achieved a fundamental victory in
this respect at the outset of the MTN by securing recognition in the
Tokyo Declaration that "special and more favorable" treatment
54
might be provided in appropriate cases.
A second fundamental achievement which developing countries
may gain from the MTN is the suggested adoption of an "enabling
clause" making the possibility of special treatment for LDCs a permanent feature of the international trading system. Such a clause would
provide not only for possible future special treatment for LDC products, but also would incorporate a principle of "graduation" from
LDC status, whereby developing countries would take on increasing
responsibilities under the GATT rules as their levels of development
advanced. As the clause is currently being drafted, there would be
other qualifications as well. It would, for example, prohibit "special
deals" between developed countries and selected LDCs; any special
treatment provided by one or more developed countries would have
to be afforded to all developing countries in similar economic circumstances (a formula for permitting some benefits to go only to the leastdeveloped developing countries). The GSP would be recognized as
the only legitimate form of tariff preference, and intra-LDC preferential arrangements would be brought under greater GATT discipline.
b. Dispute Management-Under the current GATT
rules, the first step toward resolving international trade disputes consists of consultations between the complaining government and the
government(s) against which the complaint is lodged. 55 If such consultations do not settle the matter, then it may be referred to the Contracting Parties (in the form of the GATT Council, the general
steering body) which generally will provide for review of the issue by
53 The waiver by which the GATT Contracting Parties permitted the most-favored nation
principle to be abrogated for a ten year period in order to permit the Generalized System of
Preferences to Operate, is set forth at GATT Doc. L/3545 (1971), repr'tedin GATT, 18th Supp.
BISD, at 24. For an extended discussion of the Generalized System of Preferences, see Graham,
The US. GeneralizedSystem of Preferencesfor Developing Countires:InternationalInnovation and the Art of
the Possible, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 513 (1978).
54 Tokyo Declaration, Sept. 14, 1973, GATT Doc. MIN(73)1 reprinted in GATT, 20th
Supp. BISD, at 21.
55 Such consultations may be requested under GATT art. XXII, 4 BISD, at 39, which
provides only for consultations among the parties to a dispute with a view toward amicable
settlement. Alternatively, consultations may be held under GATT art. XXIII(I), 4 BISD, at
39-40, as the required first step toward referring the dispute to the Contracting Parties for adjudication.
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a small panel of independent experts or a larger "working party" of
country representatives. The panel or working party will then hear
the parties out, ask questions and attempt to mediate an amicable
settlement. If such a settlement is impossible, the panel or working
party will issue a finding which, if it sustains the complaining government's claim, may or may not include a recommendation that an offending practice be changed or repealed. The GATT rules authorize
trade retaliation against recalcitrant offending countries as a last resort. This weapon, however, has been used only once-twenty-seven
years ago-in the history of the GATT, 56 largely because of concern
that it would start a chain of retaliation and counter-retaliation that
would defeat the system's basic purposes. Since the thrust of authorized retaliation is not in fact credible, the principal affect of an
adverse finding by a GATT panel or working party is the application
of international "peer pressure" against the offending government.
Such pressure can, of course, have the practical effect of costing the
offending country bargaining leverage in future trade disputes or negotiations.
This process has become increasingly ineffectual in recent years.
It specifies neither procedures nor time limits, with the result that
even the selection of panelists, not to mention the adoption of procedures and settlement of the disputes, may take years. 57 This potential
for delay is increased by the absence of any recognized roster of potential panelists. The legal standards for reviewing complaints have
become cumbersome and obscure, 58 and this problem is complicated
by confusion and disagreement over the role of mediation versus judicial decision-making in the dispute-settlement process. It is unclear,
for example, whether panels should attempt to mediate the dispute
while they are judging it or should confine their activities to produc56 The one case in which trade retaliation took place involved a complaint by the Netherlands against U.S. trade restrictions on dairy imports. The Contracting Parties authorized the
Netherlands to impose import quotas upon U.S. wheat exports. SeeJ. JACKSON, supra note 4, at
172, citing the decision appearing at GATT, 1st Supp. BISD, at 33.
57 A recent dispute involving complaints by the EEC against the U.S. tax provisions for
"domestic international sales corporations" took some three and one-half years from the time
the complaint was filed until the issuance of the reports by the panels.
58 Under article XXIII(l) of the GATT, a Contracting Party may complain on the
ground that
any benefit accruing to it directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being
nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is
being impeded as the result of
(a) the failure of another contracting party to carry out its obligations under
the Agreement, or
(b) the application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or
not it conflicts with the provisions of this Agreement, or
(c) the existence of any other situation. . ..
GATT, art. XXIII(I), 4 BISD, at 39-40.
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ing a well-reasoned judicial opinion, letting the diplomatic chips fall
where they may and leaving the function of mediation to occur, if at
all, after a clear decision has been rendered with respect to the alleged
infraction. Finally, the dispute-settlement bodies lately have appeared to become somewhat timid in their findings. Among the
measures being developed as possible improvements to the GATT
dispute-settlement process are remedies for each of these ills: the introduction of time limits for each stage of a procedure; the establishment of procedures and the creation of a standing roster of potential
panelists; and a clarification of the respective roles of mediation and
judicial decision-making.
In addition, the relationship of the dispute-settlement procedures
in Article XXIII of the GATT to each of the non-tariff codes is still
unsettled. At present the codes on subsidies/countervailing duties,
standards, and other non-tariff subjects contain their own dispute-settlement provisions, which are closely modeled on those of GATT Article XXIII with the main reforms incorporated. It remains
somewhat uncertain, however, whether this approach will be retained
or whether ultimately disputes arising under any of the codes will
utilize the centralized procedures set forth in (a reformed) GATT Article XXIII.
III.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TOKYO ROUND
AGREEMENTS

The manner in which the Tokyo Round agreements are implemented into U.S. domestic law will affect the future course of U.S. international trade practice at least as much as the content of the agreements
themselves. Domestic implementation will include not only those
changes in U.S. law and administrative rules that are "necessary" to
carry out U.S. commitments in the MTN agreements, but will also include some changes that are "appropriate" to implement MTN commitments. Among the appropriate changes may be significant reforms of
the procedures for handling countervailing duty complaints, escapeclause petitions, and other private-sector complaints concerning unfair
foreign trade practices. Long-standing "Buy America" preference legislation will need to be waived for qualifying imports, and a new relationship between the federal government and private standards-making and
product-testing organizations will be created.
Five years were required to negotiate these agreements. Their implementation must be accomplished in six to nine months. Current plans
call for the Administration's proposed implementing bill, which cannot be
amended after it has been formally submitted, to be sent to the Congress
in mid-April. This submission would set the "fast-track" implementation
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procedures into motion: 59 Committees reviewing the bill will have not
more than forty-five congressional working days in which to report the
bill out of Committee; the House will have fifteen working days thereafter to vote the bill up or down; and if the House acts favorably the Senate will have another thirty working days to vote on the bill. 60 These
time periods-forty-five days in Committees, fifteen days in the House,
and an additional thirty days in the Senate-add up to a maximum of
ninety congressional working days for consideration of the Administration's non-amendable proposal. Thus, if the current intention to submit
the bill in mid-April is maintained, the Congress probably will enact the
Tokyo Round results some time in September.
Because the bill cannot be amended after it has been submitted, the
Administration has been taking pains to consult with members of the
Congress and their staffs and with the official private-sector advisory
committees to the greatest extent possible prior to putting the proposed
bill into final form. Obviously the purpose of these consultations is to
take into account as many views as possible so as to gain the maximum
possible support for the bill prior to its submission.
Some tactical and policy lines are beginning to emerge. The implementing legislation will be a single bill, with different sections covering
subsidies, safeguards, and the other subjects to be implemented. To do
otherwise would subject the Tokyo Round agreements, which are seen
internationally as a delicately balanced whole, to the possibility of piecemeal defeats in the Congress. By submitting the entire implementation
in a single package, the results of the negotiations must stand or fall as a
whole.
Perhaps most important to practicing attorneys, the legislation will
probably contain greatly strengthened procedures for complaining of alleged unfair foreign trade practices, including foreign violations of the
new MTN agreements, and for securing a review of such practices by the
Administration. This review 'will include possible institution of formal
international complaint procedures under the GATT and of trade retaliation by the United States, as well as a requirement for periodic reports
to the complainant and the public on the progress of the action. These
procedures will be designed to ensure that the United States is in a position to take advantage of its newly-acquired rights under the Tokyo
Round's non-tariff agreements.
Nothing in the U.S. implementing procedures prevents the Administration or the Congress from submitting separate legislation, on the
same or related subjects, that is not formally MTN implementing legislation and thus is not subject to the rule against amendments or the fast59 The "fast-track" implementing procedures may be used for any legislation that is "necessary or appropriate" to implement a trade agreement. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(b)(1)(C) (1976). For
a discussion of these procedures, see text accompanying note 20, supra.
60 19 U.S.C. § 2191(e) (1976).
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track procedures. Possibilities for such legislation range from increased
"adjustment assistance" for workers or firms threatened by import competition, to vigorous stimulation for U.S. exports and reorganization of
the Administration's trade-policy structure.
As February draws to a close the prospects for congressional enactment of the Tokyo Round results must be regarded as good, not only
because there is much in the agreements of benefit to U.S. exporters,
importers, and consumers, but also because failure to accept the results
could have catastrophic consequences for the international trading system. Such a failure would indicate a lack of political will to resist narrowly-focused economic nationalism, and could start a chain reaction
that would result in increased protective trade barriers in all trading nations to the further detriment of the world economy. Fortunately for all
of us, the likelihood of that failure seems to be receding.

